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A tale of two elections: information, motivated reasoning, 
and the economy in the 2011 and 2015 Portuguese elections. 
Economic performance is thought to be a powerful driver of 
incumbent electoral performance, and gdp growth and unem-
ployment to be the “big two” factors involved. However, while 
in the 2011 elections, under a profound economic recession 
and growing unemployment, the Socialist incumbents lost 
about one-fourth of the electorate, the center-right coalition 
experienced losses of similar magnitude in 2015 under a recov-
ering economy and growing employment. Why has this hap-
pened? I explore three hypotheses: (1) the economy became 
a less salient issue in 2015; (2) responsibility for economic 
outcomes became more blurred in 2015; and (3) national eco-
nomic evaluations were more contaminated by partisanship 
and affected by cognitive resources and personal economic 
experiences in 2015.
keywords: elections; economic voting; motivated reasoning; 
austerity policies.
Um conto de duas eleições: informação, raciocínio moti-
vado e a economia nas eleições portuguesas de 2011 e 2015. 
Pensa-se que o desempenho da economia é um poderoso fac-
tor na explicação do desempenho eleitoral dos partidos do 
governo, e que o crescimento do pib e o desemprego são os 
“dois grandes” factores envolvidos. No entanto, enquanto o 
Partido Socialista perdeu cerca de um quarto dos votos em 
2011 sob uma profunda recessão económica e com o desem-
prego a crescer, a coligação de centro-direita sofreu perdas 
semelhantes em 2015 sob uma economia em recuperação e 
com crescimento do emprego. Por que razão sucedeu isto? 
Exploro três hipóteses: (1) a economia ter-se-á tornado um 
tema menos saliente para os eleitores em 2015; (2) a respon-
sabilidade pelos resultados da economia ter-se-á tornado mais 
difusa em 2015; e (3) as avaliações da evolução da economia 
por parte dos eleitores foram mais contaminadas pela identifi-
cação partidária e mais afetadas pelos seus recursos cognitivos 
e experiências económicas pessoais em 2015.
palavras-chave: eleições; voto económico; raciocínio moti-
vado; políticas de austeridade.
PEDRO C. MAGALHÃES
A tale of two elections:
information, motivated reasoning,
and the economy in the 2011 and 2015
Portuguese elections
I N T RODU C T ION
It was the worst of times for the Portuguese Socialists in government in the 
June 2011 elections. The economy was in its third consecutive quarter of gdp 
contraction. The unemployment rate, which by 2009 was still below 8%, was 
now reaching 12%. The budget deficit in 2010 surpassed 11% of gdp, a value 
of historical proportions. And this in spite of the successive packages of defi-
cit reduction the Socialist government had passed since March 2010, raising 
direct and indirect taxes, freezing pensions, and reducing social benefits. Just 
two months before the election, Portugal became the third Eurozone country 
— after Greece and Ireland — to seek a bailout package from the eu and the 
imf in order to maintain its debt obligations, in exchange for extensive policy 
conditionalities that included further cuts in public sector wages, pensions, 
benefits, public investment, and health and education expenditures, as well as 
further tax increases. In the June elections the Socialists got 28% of the vote, a 
loss of nearly one-fourth of their 2009 electorate and their worst electoral score 
in more than two decades.
It is hard to say that it was the best of the times for the Portuguese cen-
ter-right coalition in government as it faced elections in October 2015. After 
all, since June 2011 the psd/cds government had been the one implementing 
the austerity measures contemplated in the bailout agreement with the eu and 
the imf. However, this austerity effort was concentrated in the early years of 
the legislative term. By end of 2015 the structural deficit actually increased in 
relation to 2014, in contrast with the previous years. At the time of the elec-
tion, October 2015, Portugal had enjoyed five consecutive quarters of modest 
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but nevertheless positive gdp growth. The unemployment rate was still high, 
about 12%, but it had been brought down from the heights of nearly 18% it 
had reached in the first quarter of 2013. And yet, in the 2015 elections, the two 
government parties, running together in a pre-election coalition (Portugal à 
Frente), lost nearly 12 percentage points in vote share in relation to their com-
bined score in the 2011 election, losing about one-fourth of their 2011 elector-
ate, and obtaining their worst combined electoral score in a decade.
It is not easy to reconcile the similarity in the fates of the incumbent parties 
in these two elections with many of the core arguments in the literature about 
the relationship between economic performance and incumbent parties’ elec-
toral performance. In economic terms, “good times keep parties in office, bad 
times cast them out” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000, p. 183), and “the ‘big 
two’ (…) are unemployment and growth” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013, 
p. 376). Furthermore, “voters are myopic, with a typical memory of one year” 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013, p. 378). If this is true, a question becomes 
paramount: why did the incumbent parties perform so badly in both elections 
with such different economic contexts? This is the simple question investigated 
by this research note.
I explore three of several possible answers. The first is the possibility that in 
2015 the economy had become a less important concern in people’s minds, ren-
dering evaluations and perceptions of national economic conditions less rele-
vant for the vote function, at least in comparison with 2011. The second is the 
possibility that, for better or for worse, the center-right parties in government 
were seen by voters as less responsible for the country’s economic situation in 
2015 than the Socialists were for the economic crisis in 2011. Finally, I explore 
the possibility that regardless of the relevance of perceptions of the economic 
situation for vote choices and of the responsibility awarded to the government 
for that situation, voters’ assessments of the economy were more influenced in 
2015 by their political predispositions, their level of knowledge, and their per-
sonal economic experiences than in 2011. In other words, that the endogeneity 
of economic perceptions was more pronounced following the period of modest 
economic growth in 2015 than following the period of economic crisis in 2011. 
The data I have been able to amass so far favors this last interpretation. In the 
conclusion, some potential implications of this are discussed.
T H E S A L I E NC E OF E C ONOM IC C ONC E R N S
To restate: why did the incumbent parties perform so badly in both elections 
with such different economic contexts? One explanation for this may simply 
be that the state of the economy competes with other issues in the definition 
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of what the elections are about. Regardless of whether we assume voters to be 
primarily retrospective or prospective, government’s handling of the economy 
is not the single imaginable concern of voters. Corruption, crime, the environ-
ment, education, foreign policy, immigration, and many other issues may be 
downplayed or reinforced in importance as a result of objective conditions and 
political agenda-setting and framing, especially as a result of the efforts on the 
part of political actors who “own” those issues (RePass, 1971). This is thought 
to be highly consequential for the way voters evaluate incumbents: “any issue 
singled out as personally most important plays a substantially greater role for 
those who so view it than it does for others” (Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby, 
1982, p. 57). Furthermore, and rather importantly for our case, several studies 
have shown that the salience of the economy as an issue and the reliance of 
voters on economic factors to base their vote choices seems to increase during 
economic downturns, because such downturns tend to generate greater media 
and public attention (Harrington, 1989; Soroka, 2006). In a recent compara-
tive study, Singer summarizes these findings by showing that “economic issues 
gain widespread importance as the economic climate worsens” (Singer, 2011, 
p. 301), and that “voters who said that the economy was important place 
greater weight on economic outcomes [when voting] than the rest of the cit-
izenry” (Singer, 2011, p. 297). This suggests that, for Portuguese voters, the 
economy may simply have become less important an issue in 2015 than it had 
been in 2011.
Our ability to test all implications of these ideas is limited by the fact that 
we are dealing with just two cases, and are furthermore unable to look at this 
explicitly at the individual level. The 2011 and 2015 Portuguese post-election 
surveys are not exactly alike, differing in one crucial aspect. In 2011, the sur-
vey contained an open-ended question about “the most important issue, for 
you personally, in this election.” Following recoding, only ten issues received 
mention by more than 1 percent of respondents. The economy — expressed 
in terms like “the economic situation”, “the economic crisis”, and “unemploy-
ment” — was mentioned directly by 23% of respondents and was, by far, the 
most mentioned topic. However, in 2015, there is no such question on the basis 
of which to make an aggregate-level comparison, and much less to test whether 
different individuals voted differently on the basis of their issue priorities.
However, other data sources allow us to at least evaluate the plausibility of 
the idea that by 2015 the economy had become less salient an issue for voters 
than in 2011. The Eurobarometer regularly poses a question about “the two 
most important issues facing (our country) at the moment?” The slope graph 
in Figure 1 shows the proportion of respondents who selected the three most 
mentioned issues in the Eurobarometer waves of May 2011 (one month before 
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the election) and on the average of the May 2015/November 2015 surveys (the 
election was in October). Furthermore, I show the similar trend pertaining to 
the most mentioned issue besides those “big three” (“Other”) and also for the 
most mentioned non-economic issue (“Crime”).
First, note that “unemployment,” “the economic situation,” and “inflation/
cost of living” were, in both periods, the three issues most mentioned as “most 
important.” To be sure, the percentage of respondents who were concerned 
with the economic situation and with inflation seems to have fallen from 2011 
to 2015, while the fourth most mentioned issue (“Other”) picked up steam 
from one period to the next. However, there is no substantial decline for the 
most mentioned issue (“unemployment”). Furthermore, note that while in 
May 2011 the fourth most selected issue was “taxes,” in all subsequent surveys 
until 2015 that issue was “government debt/budget deficit,” which is obviously 
connected with the management of the economy by the government. Finally, 
of all issues included in the eb surveys’ questionnaire, the one that is most 
mentioned while being clearly decoupled from the economy is “crime.” As we 
can see, in 2015 mentions of “crime” had become even fewer than they were in 
2011. In other words, the evidence that the state of the economy and economic 
developments ceased to be paramount in the minds of Portuguese voters in 
2015 is far from clear on the basis of these data.
Crime — 6%
Other — 11%
Inflation — 31%
Economic situation — 47%
Unemployment — 66%
3% — Crime
20% — Other
22% — Inflation
32% — Economic situation
63% — Unemployment
MAY 2011 MAY/NOV 2015
FIGURE 1
Percentage of respondents selecting each issue as “one of the two most important 
facing the country”, EB 73 and EB 83/84
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Another way of capturing the salience of different issues is to look at the 
media. Figure 2, another slope graph, shows the number of news items in the 
Portuguese media containing particular words or expressions as a proportion 
of the number of news items containing the word “elections,” in the 90 days 
before the date of each election. I used an api from the News web service devel-
oped by sapo Labs, containing the texts of all online news items issued by all 
major Portuguese news sources (including all major newspapers and tv and 
radio stations, as well as online-only news websites) and by the Portuguese 
news agency, Lusa.
In the 90 days before the 2011 election, 18,881 news items employed the 
word “economy” (“economia”) in their title or in the body of the text, rep-
resenting 0.81 of all items containing the word “elections” (“eleições”) in the 
same period. In the 90 days before the 2015 election, that proportion was 
basically the same (0.80). Mentions of “public debt” (“dívida publica”) or 
“deficit” (“défice”) did fall in comparison to 2011, but mentions of “unem-
ployment” (“desemprego”) or “inflation”/“cost of living” (“inflação”/“custo 
de vida”) remained mostly stable, while mentions of “crime”/“criminality” 
(“crime”/“criminalidade”) increased, but still below those of the two most 
mentioned economic topics. Thus, in general, using an admittedly rough mea-
sure of the presence of these themes in news items, and in this case with the 
Inflation — 0,08
Crime — 0,23
Unemployment — 0,27
Debt/Deficit — 0,42
Economy — 0,81
0,06 — Inflation
0,25 — Unemployment
0,31 — Crime
0,33 — Debt/Deficit
0,80 — Economy
MAR/JUN 2011 JUL/OCT 2015
FIGURE 2
News items in Portuguese online media sources employing particular words
as a proportion of items mentioning the word “elections” in the 90 days before
the election.
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exception of “public debt”/“deficit,” we see again little evidence that economic 
issues had became less important in the news agenda during the campaign in 
2015 in comparison to 2011.
A final piece of evidence concerning the salience of the economy for vot-
ing is a more direct one, and concerns the relationship between voters’ retro-
spective evaluation of the state of the economy and their voting choices. If the 
economy had become a less salient issue for voters, one should expect eval-
uations of the economy to play a smaller role in the vote function in 2015 in 
comparison with 2011, which in turn might account for the inability of the 
incumbent center-right parties to capitalize on the economic improvement of 
2014-2015. In both post-election surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015, respon-
dents were asked about whether, in the last 12 months, the state of the economy 
had become “much worse,” “somewhat worse”, “stayed the same,” “somewhat 
better,” or “much better,” i. e., the basic retrospective sociotropic question. 
Table 1 shows the result of probit regression analyses of the vote for the incum-
bent party in 2011 (the Socialist Party) and 2015 (the psd/cds coalition) vs. 
the vote for any of the opposition parties. All independent variables are either 
dummy variables (Female, Union membership, Proximity to  incumbent party) 
TABLE 1
Probit regressions of vote for the incumbent party or parties, 2011 and 2015 (standard 
errors in parentheses)
Independent variables 2011 study 2015 study
Retrospective sociotropic
Marginal effect 95% CI
.53**
(.16)
.10 [.04,.15]
.98***
(.14)
.20 [.14,.25]
Retrospective egocentric
Marginal effect 95% CI
.29
(.17)
.05 [-.01,.11]
.22
(.14)
.04 [-.01,.10]
Proximity to incumbent
2.48***
(.19)
2.99***
(.28)
Controls
Female, age, education,
union membership, religiosity.
Constant
-1.44*
(.62)
-.84***
(.06)
Pseudo R2
N
.45
489
.46
831
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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or have been standardized by being divided by two standard deviations, ren-
dering coefficients roughly comparable with those pertaining to the dummy 
variables.
From the results we see no evidence that in 2015 economic evaluations 
were weaker correlates of the vote for the incumbent than in 2011. In fact, the 
results point in the opposite direction. The size of the coefficient for retrospec-
tive sociotropic evaluations in 2011 is about half of the size in 2015. Moving 
from the minimum to the maximum retrospective evaluation of the economy 
in 2011 — while keeping the remaining variables at their mean values — 
is estimated to increase the probability of voting for the incumbent party 
by about 10 percentage points. That increase, for 2015, is estimated to be of 
about 20 percentage points, with the 95% confidence intervals of this and the 
previous marginal effect barely overlapping. Other results point to a predict-
ably very large effect of partisanship and to the negligible effect of egocentric 
evaluations once both sociotropic evaluations and partisanship are taken into 
account — both findings being widely reported in the literature. In any case, 
the main message is relatively simple. The decreasing salience of the economy 
as a campaign issue, and the possible decrease in importance of economic 
evaluations as determinants of the vote for the incumbent party, do not seem, 
on the basis of these data, particularly promising explanations for the puzzle 
being addressed.
R E SP ON SI BI L I T Y F OR T H E E C ONOM Y
Another reason why the incumbent parties in 2015 may have failed to ben-
efit from improvements in the objective economy could be related to “clar-
ity of responsibility.” Governments control the economy to different extents. 
Lower control makes it more difficult for voters to blame or reward govern-
ments for past performance (Powell and Whitten, 1993) or leads them to give 
more weight to exogenous factors when using past performance to select a 
new incumbent (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Variables that shape control 
are thought to be institutional features that increase opposition influence in 
national policymaking (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Duch and Stevenson, 2008, 
pp. 277-286) or disperse power across multiple levels of government within 
a country (Anderson, 2006), as well and levels of economic interdependence 
that diminish elected policy makers’ control over the economy (Hellwig, 2001; 
Hellwig and Samuels, 2007). Furthermore, several studies have shown that 
even under relatively stable structural conditions, messages and framing on 
the part of political elites and the media can operate important effects on the 
extent to which people perceive governments to be in control of the  economy 
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and, thus, assign responsibility to incumbents for economic outcomes ( Hellwig 
and Coffey, 2011; Magalhães, 2014).
Although I obviously lack the number of cases that would allow me to 
explore variation in “clarity of responsibility” across elections, the 2011 and 
2015 post-election surveys allow us to gain some insight in this respect. Fol-
lowing the questions on the state of the economy, the two post-election sur-
veys asked respondents “To what extent do you think the following institutions 
and situations are responsible for the state of the economy in recent years?”. 
Following that introduction, respondents were asked to rate a list of agents and 
factors as being “not at all responsible,” “with little responsibility,” “somewhat 
responsible,” “very responsible,” and “extremely responsible”. Figure 3 shows 
the percentage of respondents that, in both surveys, rated each factor as “very” 
or “extremely” responsible.
There are some small fluctuations from 2011 to 2015. In particular, in 
comparison with 2011, fewer respondents thought in 2015 that rating agen-
cies, the international economy, and the Euro were “very” or “extremely” 
responsible for the state of the Portuguese economy. In contrast, the European 
Union, the Bank of Portugal, banks in general, and the opposition parties were 
seen as responsible by more respondents than in 2011. Having said that, these 
 differences between the two surveys are relatively small, and the same basic 
FIGURE 3
Percentage of respondents who rated situations or institutions “very” or “extremely 
responsible” for the state of the Portuguese economy.
The government
The EU
Bank of Portugal
International Economy
Banks
The Euro
The opposition
Rating agencies
800 20 40 60
50%
39%
32%
37%
47%
40%
50%
55%
53%
43%
44%
50%
47%
52%
65%
67%
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structure is maintained: while the government stands out as the factor most 
people see as responsible for the economic situation, many voters also assign 
strong responsibility for the economy to many agents and forces.
Fuller use of the survey information available on this topic can be made. 
Responsibility for the economy for each of those factors is coded from 1 to 5, 
from “not at all” to “extremely” responsible. Thus, a new variable was created 
in which the maximum value awarded to each factor other than the govern-
ment was subtracted from the value awarded to the government. Positive val-
ues mean that the government was seen as more responsible for the state of 
the economy than any other factor. Negative values mean that at least one of 
those factors is held more responsible for the economy than the government. 
Figure 4 shows how respondents were distributed along the values of this vari-
able for both surveys.
The two histograms are remarkably similar. The most frequent value is 
zero, meaning that most respondents attributed equal responsibility for the 
economy to the government and to at least one of the other agents or factors. 
Conversely, in 2011 and 2015, respectively, only about 12% and 14% of respon-
dents thought the government was more responsible than any other factor for 
the state of the economy. The picture that emerges, therefore, is one in which 
government’s responsibility for the economy is considerably blurred for many 
FIGURE 4
The government’s responsibility for the state of the economy minus that of the other 
most responsible factor, 2011 and 2015.
432-4 -1 1-2 0-3 432-4 -1 1-2 0-3
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2011 2015
Government’s responsability minus other most responsible agent Government’s responsability minus other most responsible agent
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voters, in both 2011 and 2015. Early on, I speculated that one of the reasons 
why the center-right coalition failed to capitalize on the positive economic 
performance in the year and a half before the 2015 election was that it was held 
less accountable for economic performance than the Socialists were in 2011. 
However, in general, we end up seeing no difference in the overall distribution 
of these assignments of economic responsibility to the government from one 
election to the next.
It is not entirely surprising that few changes took place between 2011 and 
2015 in this respect. None of the structural features thought to be crucial wit-
nessed any major change in this period. None of the incumbents was a sin-
gle-party majority government. Instead, while the Socialists ruled alone with 
a minority government, psd and cds ruled with a majority coalition. By 2015 
the country remained as much a centralized state — one of the most central-
ized in Europe — as it had been in 2011. And Portugal obviously remained as 
a relatively small and open economy in those years, with its economic policies 
constrained by Eurozone membership and all that it entails.
Furthermore, regardless of the contextual aspects, institutional and eco-
nomic, that might conceivably affect the assignment of responsibility to the 
government, there is increasing evidence that these judgments of responsi-
bility are shaped by relatively stable predispositions of voters. As Bisgaard 
(2015) shows, even when they converge on a consensual negative evaluation 
of economic conditions, individuals construct, with the help of partisan cues 
and media spin, their own accounts about who is responsible for that negative 
outcome, an account that tends to be consistent with their partisan identi-
ties. Portugal was no different in this regard. Figure 5 shows, for 2011 and 
2015, how, among those who made a negative retrospective evaluation of the 
economy, government partisans and other voters assigned responsibility for 
the economy to the government, using the measure described above. Among 
partisans of the incumbent party, ps in 2011 and psd/cds in 2015, the distri-
bution is clearly more skewed to the left, meaning that more voters assigned 
greater responsibility for the (negative) economy to any factor other than the 
action of the government. For the remaining voters who evaluated the econ-
omy negatively, the exoneration of the government was much less pronounced. 
The patterns are very similar in both elections.
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T H E C ON DI T IONA L E N D O G E N E I T Y OF E C ONOM IC E VA LUAT ION S
So why was the right punished by an improving economy as much as the 
Socialists were punished by a massive economic crisis? A third possibility is 
that, although several objective indicators pertaining to the Portuguese econ-
omy were indeed improving before the 2015 elections, other factors interfered 
FIGURE 5
Assigning responsibility to the government among those who made negative retros-
pective evaluations: 2011vs. 2015, government partisans vs. others
432-4 -1 1-2 0-3 432-4 -1 1-2 0-3
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2011 2015
Government partisans Government partisans
432-4 -1 1-2 0-3 432-4 -1 1-2 0-3
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2011 — Others 2015 — Others
Government’s responsability minus other most responsible agent Government’s responsability minus other most responsible agent
Government’s responsability minus other most responsible agent Government’s responsability minus other most responsible agent
748 PEDRO C. MAGALHÃES
with the perception of such improvements. In contrast to the two preceding 
speculations, this does not imply that the economy was less important an issue 
in the political agenda in 2015 or that economic perceptions were more weakly 
correlated with the vote (the “salience” hypothesis). Nor does it require that 
the government was seen to be less responsible for economic conditions (the 
“responsibility” hypothesis) in 2015. Instead, it implies that in 2015 voters’ 
views of the state of the economy may have been less a function of objective 
macroeconomics than in 2011, and instead more a function of their own pre-
dispositions, knowledge, and personal economic experiences. In other words, 
it implies that economic perceptions may have been more endogenous in 2015 
than in 2011.
In the last decade and a half, an important body of research has shown 
that, as Anderson puts it, “citizens are likely to systematically misjudge the 
state of the economy even when it is presented to them on a silver platter” 
(Anderson, 2007). That misjudgment is not random. When seeking informa-
tion, “directional goals”, which motivate individuals to “apply their reason-
ing powers in defense of prior, specific conclusion” (Taber and Lodge, 2006, 
p. 756), are often paramount. The result is that citizens’ understanding of the 
political, social, and economic contexts is pervaded by partisan motivated 
reasoning that serves those directional goals (Bartels, 2002). One implication 
of this is that the impact of economic perceptions on the vote is likely to be 
overestimated if one does not take into account how those perceptions are 
themselves conditioned by partisanship and other aspects of partisan approval 
in the first place (see Evans and Andersen, 2006 and Evans and Pickup, 2010, 
among many). On the other hand, even when motivated by “accuracy goals,” 
individuals are affected by the information they have accumulated on the basis 
of their personal experience and constrained by their ability to seek further 
information. Thus, it is not surprising that “how people view economic perfor-
mance is shaped by their political predispositions, personal financial experi-
ences, socioeconomic situation, and level of understanding about the political 
economy” (Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000, p. 649).
Having said that, the extent to which economic perceptions become 
endogenous is likely to be contingent upon different factors. There are two 
main arguments, one of a more general nature, and another more specific 
to the economic and political context experience by a country like Portugal 
from 2011 to 2015, that may explain the extent to which economic percep-
tions become endogenous. First, economic performance itself may be rele-
vant in this respect. Evans and Andersen (2006, p.195) suggested early on 
that serious economic downturns “would elicit shared and reasonably per-
ceptive responses that are not powerfully affected by political conditioning.” 
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As Dickerson (2015, p. 2) puts it, “voters are more heavily exposed to nega-
tive economic information during economic downturns, which may conflict 
with their prior political attitudes – attitudes that subsequently become less 
useful as cognitive shortcuts for processing economic information”. In con-
trast, under conditions of relative stability, “partisan ‘contamination’ of voters’ 
understanding of economic performance is much more likely” (Evans and 
Andersen, 2006, p. 195). Chzhen, Evans, and Pickup (2014), using panel sur-
veys covering two different periods, one of moderate economic growth (1997- 
-2001) and another of economic crisis (2005-2010), show that in the  former the 
positive correlation between economic perceptions and incumbent approval 
should be seen as a consequence of the fact that people who approve of the 
incumbent develop a better evaluation of the economy. In contrast, during the 
period of economic crisis, economic perceptions do seem to have an exog-
enous effect on incumbent approval. They conclude that “when voters per-
ceive the economy as a salient issue and react to clearer economic signals, they 
adjust their preferences accordingly”, and thus that “during economic crises, 
the role of economic perceptions as sources of electoral accountability (…) is 
to some degree validated” (Chzen, Evans, and Pickup, 2014, p. 308). However, 
under conditions of economic stability or modest growth, economic percep-
tions are more determined by partisan preferences. Similarly, Dickerson, also 
using panel data, finds that economic perceptions had a stronger exogenous 
effect on presidential approval in the us during the Great Recession than in 
other periods (Dickerson, 2015).
The second argument as to why economic perceptions may have been 
more endogenous in 2015 than in 2011 has to do with the specific political 
and economic circumstances that preceded the former election. Examining 
the popular reactions to the Great Recession and summarizing the contribu-
tions to their edited volume, Bermeo and Bartels note that such reactions were 
often “associated less with the direct economic repercussions of the crisis than 
with the government initiatives to cope with those repercussions” (Bermeo 
and Bartels, 2014, p. 4). Austerity provides “a much more salient focal point 
for mobilization than the release of statistics on economic growth and unem-
ployment,” and serves as a “trigger that enables ordinary people to link eco-
nomic hardship directly to the action of incumbent political elites” (Bermeo 
and Bartels, 2014, p. 29). Furthermore, as Achen and Bartels argue (2016), if 
it is generally true that voters’ “factual judgments are likely to be significantly 
and pervasively influenced by their partisan dispositions” (Achen and Bartels, 
2016, p. 284), this “contamination” can be further strengthened in reaction 
to particular political developments: “when political events make a particular 
identity salient or threatened, powerful psychological forces can be evoked, 
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with effects that go well beyond the impact of the issues involved” (Achen 
and Bartels, 2016, p. 267). In other words, the austerity policies pursued in 
the sequence of the Portuguese bailout — whose rejection by the Portuguese 
electorate increased continuously since 2011 (Moury and Freire, 2013) — 
their enormous salience and contentiousness, may have constituted triggers 
that activated among voters a stronger connection between their personal 
economic circumstances and their partisan identities and their views of the 
“objective” economy.1
a path model
Unfortunately, we lack panel survey data for the period preceding either the 
2011 or the 2015 Portuguese elections, which would allow us to examine 
the question of endogeneity of economic perceptions more fully. However, a 
somewhat better examination can be made than by just modeling the vote for 
the incumbent as the combined direct and unmediated effect of economic per-
ceptions, partisanship, and other factors, as I did in the analysis whose results 
are presented in Table 1. Instead, I propose and estimate a path model for the 
vote choice in both elections, using structural equation modeling.
In the analysis whose results were presented in Table 1, we could see the 
relationship between the vote and a list of variables assumed, for theoreti-
cal reasons, to be predictive of that vote — such as retrospective economic 
evaluations, partisanship, etc. The multiple regression — in that case, a pro-
bit regression — allowed the estimation of the independent contribution of 
each predictor to the determination of the dependent variable, i. e., taking 
into account the collinearity patterns among the predictors. However, path 
analysis allows us to also examine the structure of the relationships between 
the predictor variables, and thus of the plausibility of a particular causal path 
among the predictors and toward the criterion variable. In other words, path 
analysis contemplates not only direct effects, in which one predictor affects 
the response variable, but also indirect effects, in which one predictor affects 
another predictor, which in turn affects the response variable. Obviously, the 
use of “causal” language is allusive: path analyses do not establish causality, but 
only reveal the extent to which hypothesized causal paths fit the observational 
data.
Figure 6 presents our proposed path model. Vote for the incumbent party 
vs. opposition (a dichotomous variable with 1 representing vote for incum-
bent) is modeled as a function of partisanship, retrospective sociotropic eval-
uations of the economy, and several control variables (gender, education, age, 
1 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for calling attention to these points.
 PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS: INFORMATION, MOTIVATED REASONING, AND THE ECONOMY 751
union membership, education, and religiosity). The controls are not detailed in 
the diagram, with the exception of education, for reasons that will be explained 
later. Furthermore, an additional variable in the vote equation aims to capture 
the retrospective personal economic situation of the respondent. However, 
instead of relying on the conventional retrospective egocentric or pocketbook 
question –“would you say that your personal economic situation has gotten 
worse, better, or stayed the same?” – I employ a different strategy less likely 
to generate answers contaminated by voters’ prior partisan predispositions. 
In both surveys, respondents were asked a factual question: if, at any point 
since the last election, they had “lost their job,” “had their salary or pension cut 
or frozen,” or moved from “full time to part time” work, i. e., all aspects that 
reflect the potential impact of the economic crisis and the austerity measures 
taken by the Socialist, first, and the center-right government, later.
Another implication of this path model is that I assume neither partisan-
ship nor economic evaluations to be exogenous variables. Instead, I assume that 
evaluations of the national economy to be affected by partisanship, as a result 
of partisan motivated reasoning, and also by individuals’ cognitive resources 
and personal economic experiences. In other words, I expect economic per-
ceptions to be affected by education and the extent to which individuals were 
personally affected by the crisis. For partisanship, the basic expectation is 
that incumbent partisans will have more positive evaluations of the economy. 
FIGURE 6
A path model of voting for the incumbent party in Portugal
Education
Partisanship:
close to incumbent 
party
Retrospective 
sociotropic econo-
mic evaluations
Controls for the 
partisanship and 
vote equations:
Female
Age
Union membership
Religiosity
Vote for
incumbent
Personally
affected by crisis
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I also expect that people who were more personally affected by the crisis should 
make a more negative evaluation of the evolution of the national economy. 
Finally, I expect people with higher levels of education to be more informed of 
the actual changes in the national economy, controlling for their partisanship, 
how they were personally affected and regardless of how education may affect 
the vote and partisanship in the first place. Therefore, education should have 
a negative sign in 2011 and a positive sign in 2015. Partisanship is also treated 
as an endogenous variable, determined not only by the set of control vari-
ables (including education) and also by the objective economic experiences 
of respondents during the term of office of the incumbent. Finally, and most 
importantly, if Evans and Andersen’s (2006) speculation is correct and taking 
into account the findings by Chzhen, Evans, and Pickup (2014) and Dickerson 
(2015), economic evaluations around the election that followed a pronounced 
economic downturn (2011) should be less contaminated by all of these factors 
than in 2015.
results
Path models are a particular case of structural equation models, but containing 
only observed variables and one indicator per variable. I first estimated the 
model in Figure 6 for both the 2011 and 2015 elections, using linear probability 
models, i. e., treating all variables as continuous, in order to be able to obtain fit 
statistics (later I test a more appropriate specification using probit and ordered 
probit). These models already showed a reasonably good fit but also that, in 
both cases, after estimating modification indices, fit could be further improved 
by including Female in the equation for national economic evaluations. Table 2 
thus shows the results of the final linear probability path model for both elec-
tions. Parameters for the control variables are not shown.
The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (rmsea), the Comparative 
Fit Index (cfi), and the Tucker-Lewis Index (tli) measures of model fit, in all 
cases indicate a good model fit. The coefficient of determination (cd) is tan-
tamount to an r-squared, indicating that variance explained is lower in 2011 
than in 2015. In the vote equation, in the first section of the table, we can see 
the result we have already observed: economic evaluations have a significant 
positive relationship with the vote, stronger in 2015 than in 2011, and personal 
economic circumstances have no direct effects on vote choice.
However, the results for the economic evaluations equation, in the sec-
ond part of the table, are completely different in the two elections. In 2015 
economic evaluations were driven by partisanship, the extent to which the 
respondent was personally affected by the crisis, and education (with more 
educated respondents making a better evaluation of the economy). In 2011 
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none of these variables has a coefficient that is statistically different from zero. 
In other words, while economic evaluations were strongly predictive of the 
vote for the incumbent in 2015, such evaluations were clearly endogenous. The 
same cannot be said for 2011, on the basis of this analysis.
Another interesting aspect of the results pertains to the effect of the respon-
dent’s personal economic situation, captured here in terms of how his or her 
TABLE 2
Linear probability path model (standardized coefficients) for the 2011 and 2015 elections
Parameters 2011 study 2015 study
Closeness to incumbent party  Vote for incumbent
.75***
(.03)
.68***
(.03)
Retrospective sociotropic  Vote for incumbent
.10***
(.03)
.23***
(.03)
Personally affected  Vote for incumbent
.03
(.03)
-.02
(.03)
Education  Vote for incumbent
-.06
(.03)
.03
(.03)
Closeness to incumbent party  Retrospective sociotropic
.02
(.06)
.35***
(.04)
Personally affected  Retrospective sociotropic
-.04
(.05)
-.19***
(.03)
Education  Retrospective sociotropic
.02
(.05)
.25***
(.03)
Female  Retrospective sociotropic
-12*
(.04)
-.08*
(.03)
Affected by crisis  Closeness to incumbent party
-.05
(.04)
-.08*
(.03)
Education  Closeness to incumbent party
-.05
(.04)
.11**
(.04)
X2 (df) 5.88(4) 4.97(3)
RMSEA .045 .029
CFI .992 .997
TLI .944 .981
CD .051 .129
N 469 803
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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income and job security was affected in recent years. The standard account in 
the economic voting literature is that “pocketbook effects are weak to nonex-
istent” (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2013, p. 371), and that much could be con-
cluded by looking at the results either in Table 1 or the vote equation in the first 
section of Table 3. However, a more complete analysis of the 2015 elections 
suggest that, even employing a measure of personal economic circumstances 
more likely to be exogenous than the traditional “egocentric retrospective” 
measure, individual economic difficulties do matter for the vote. But they seem 
to do so indirectly: both by decreasing the probability that one has remained a 
partisan of the incumbent party and, especially, by promoting a more negative 
evaluation of national economic conditions. This only occurred, however, in 
TABLE 3
Probit and ordered probit structural equation models (standardized coefficients) for 
the 2011 and 2015 elections
Parameters 2011 study 2015 study
Closeness to incumbent party  Vote for incumbent
2.51***
(.19)
2.94***
(.28)
Retrospective sociotropic  Vote for incumbent
.56***
(.16)
1.05***
(.14)
Personally affected  Vote for incumbent
.13
(.17)
-.06
(.13)
Education  Vote for incumbent
-.40*
(.20)
.15
(.16)
Closeness to incumbent party  Retrospective sociotropic
.04
(.13)
.83***
(.09)
Personally affected  Retrospective sociotropic
-.10
(.12)
-.44***
(.08)
Education  Retrospective sociotropic
.02
(.11)
.58***
(.08)
Female  Retrospective sociotropic
-.28*
(.11)
-.18*
(.08)
Affected by crisis  Closeness to incumbent party
-.17
(.14)
-.28*
(.08)
Education  Closeness to incumbent party
-.17
(.15)
.38**
(.12)
N 469 803
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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the election where, objectively, those conditions were more favorable. Under 
the economic crisis context of 2011, no such effects emerge.
Table 3 shows the results after I use probit for the vote choice and parti-
sanship equations, and ordered probit for the economic evaluations equation, 
using a generalized structural equation model. They do not differ in any major 
way from those obtained in the linear probability structural equation model.
The implications are simple. Although the economy was doing better in 
2015, voters’ perception of the state of economy, consequential as it was for the 
vote choice, seems to have been much more contaminated by causally prior 
aspects than in 2011. Those voters who were not partisans of any of the gov-
ernment parties were not only less likely to vote for them – as in 2011 – but 
also less likely to form a positive evaluation of the economy in the first place. 
Less educated voters were also less likely to have perceived any improvements 
in the national economy, and so were those who had been personally affected 
in terms of their income and job security during the preceding term of office of 
the legislative term. In 2011 no such indirect effects of partisanship, education, 
or personal economic circumstances are visible.
DI S C U S SION
Why did voters punish the government parties in a context of economic crisis 
in 2011 but also under an improving economy in 2015? I discussed three pos-
sible answers to that question. The first was the possibility that the economy 
had become a less salient issue than in 2015 than it was in 2011. However, we 
saw little evidence of that being the case, and even showed a stronger relation-
ship between economic perceptions and the vote in 2015. The second was the 
possibility that voters failed to attribute responsibility to the government for 
the economic situation in 2015. We indeed saw that many voters attributed 
such responsibility to actors and forces beyond the government’s control, but 
also that, from this point of view, 2015 was no different from 2011. Finally, I 
discussed the possibility that economic perceptions, regardless of the strength 
of their relationship with the vote, were in and of themselves shaped by differ-
ent forces in 2011 and 2015. And this seems indeed to be the case.
Why? With just two different elections analyzed with cross-sectional sur-
vey data, with all the limitations that implies, it is impossible to be categorical. 
However, two possible answers emerge. The first is that economic perceptions 
are generally more likely to be exogenous in contexts where objective economic 
performance is negative (Evans and Andersen, 2006). This would explain why, 
unlike what happened in 2011, the period of real but modest economic growth 
that preceded the 2015 elections led to divergences around the perceived 
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state of the economy being structured not only on a partisan basis, but also 
in terms of cognitive resources and personal economic experiences. Further-
more, it would help to account for the often replicated finding ( Mueller, 1970; 
Nannestad and Paldam, 1997; Bélanger and Meguid, 2008; Singer, 2011) that 
economic effects on the vote are asymmetric, i.e, that incumbents are more 
harmed by negative economic developments than they are benefitted by pos-
itive ones.
The second argument, more specific to the context of Portugal and other 
countries after 2011, is that the austerity policies pursued with greater pub-
lic salience and vigor during part of the term that led to the 2015 elections 
were themselves responsible for activating the personal economic hardships 
and partisan identities of voters as lenses through which to view the national 
“objective” economy (Bermeo and Bartels, 2014; Achen and Bartels, 2016), 
thus dampening the effect of recovery. This would help to account for why, 
in other countries also experiencing economic improvements in post-auster-
ity contexts – such as Spain in 2015 or Ireland in 2016 – incumbent parties 
nonetheless experienced important electoral losses (16 points for pp in Spain, 
22 points for fg and Labor in Ireland. Furthermore, this should also lead us 
to reconsider the circumstances under which traditional “retrospective socio-
tropic” accounts of economic voting prevail and those under which resilient 
personal economic hardship (Marsh and McElroy, 2016, p. 170), labor market 
marginalization (Fernández-Albertos, 2015), and other enduring legacies of 
crisis and austerity prevent the incumbent parties from fully reaping the ben-
efits of objective economic recovery at the national level.
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